Global & US Headlines
Trump Fast-Tracks Taiwan Arms: Executive Order & $1.15 B Funding, With $20 B Sale Teed Up
Within 48 hours (Feb 6-7 2026) President Trump both signed a US$1.15 b Taiwan security appropriation and issued an “America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” clearing procedural hurdles and signalling a pending arms package that could reach US$20 b.
Focusing Facts
- Consolidated Appropriations Act signed 6 Feb 2026 earmarks US$1 b for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative, US$150 m for upgrades, and a floor of US$300 m in Foreign Military Financing.
- Executive Order of 7 Feb 2026 replaces the first-come-first-served queue with priority delivery for partners that raise defence spending—Taiwan has pledged 3.3 % of GDP in 2026, aiming for 5 % by 2030.
- Financial Times (8 Feb 2026) says State and DoD are drafting a Taiwan package worth up to US$20 b (NASAMS, Patriot, IBCS), which Beijing warns could cancel Trump’s April summit with Xi.
Context
Moments like this recall the 1992 sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan, announced just weeks before President Bush met Chinese Premier Li Peng—a move that froze bilateral talks for years. Today’s tandem of legislation and executive action fits a century-long U.S. pattern of using arms transfers both as leverage and as trip-wires for deterrence (cf. Lend-Lease 1941: arms first, alliance later). Structurally, the shift from a bureaucratic queue to a hierarchy based on partners’ own spending formalises an emerging pay-to-play logic visible across NATO after Russia’s 2022 invasion and mirrors a wider re-nationalisation of defence supply chains. Why does Feb 2026 matter on a 100-year arc? Because it tests whether Taiwan can translate external guarantees into internal consensus: without the stalled NT$1.25 trn budget, the new U.S. “priority” status evaporates. At the same time, China’s threat to scrap an April summit reprises Cold-War summitry brinkmanship (Khrushchev cancelling the 1960 Paris talks after the U-2 incident). Whether these weapons ever reach Taiwan or merely serve as bargaining chips will signal if the Pacific descends into an arms-race cycle or finds a new equilibrium of credible self-help backed—selectively—by distant patrons.
Perspectives
Taiwanese English-language media and U.S. defense analysts
Taiwanese English-language media and U.S. defense analysts — They present the new "America First" arms-transfer rules and fresh U.S. funding bills as a welcome acceleration of badly needed weapons deliveries that will strengthen Taiwan’s deterrence posture against Beijing. Because these outlets cater to a domestic audience worried about security and to Washington-aligned experts, they downplay the possibility that larger arms packages could inflame cross-strait tensions and mostly frame legislative gridlock in Taipei—not U.S. policy—as the main danger. ( Focus Taiwan (CNA English News) , Taipei Times )
European parliamentary delegation visiting Taipei
European parliamentary delegation visiting Taipei — Drawing parallels with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the lawmakers warn that Taiwan must first boost its own defense spending, build social resilience and achieve political unity if it hopes to deter China. Their messaging shifts responsibility onto Taiwan and highlights Europe’s cautionary lessons, which conveniently absolves European governments of heavier security commitments while positioning their countries as moral advisers—and potential arms suppliers—without delving into Taiwan’s budgetary constraints. ( Taipei Times , Focus Taiwan (CNA English News) )
Foreign commentary critical of U.S. arms sales
bankingnews.gr — The piece depicts continued U.S. weapons transfers as provocative meddling that violates China’s sovereignty and could derail President Trump’s planned rapprochement with Beijing. It adopts Beijing’s "red-line" narrative and characterises Washington’s policy as inherently aggressive, glossing over China’s own military pressure on Taiwan and implying that stability rests solely on U.S. restraint.