Global & US Headlines
New START Treaty Lapses Amid Last-Minute, Unratified U.S.–Russia Abu Dhabi Talks
At 00:00 GMT on 5 Feb 2026 the New START arms-control pact expired for lack of a signed extension, while negotiators in Abu Dhabi failed to clinch a formal deal, leaving both powers legally unconstrained for the first time in 54 years.
Focusing Facts
- The treaty’s 1,550-warhead/700-launcher ceiling ceased to be legally binding when its single permissible extension, granted in 2021, ran out on 5 Feb 2026.
- Axios reported that envoys negotiated a provisional six-month mutual observance in Abu Dhabi within the 24 hours before expiry, but no document had been signed by the deadline.
- Moscow had publicly offered a one-year roll-over of the existing limits, yet President Trump conditioned any new accord on bringing China’s ~600-warhead arsenal into the talks.
Context
The sudden absence of a bilateral ceiling echoes the May 2002 U.S. exit from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which likewise removed a keystone without a ready replacement and accelerated missile-defence R&D. Historically, major-power arms-control ‘vacations’—from the 1936 collapse of the Washington Naval treaties to the 1979–1985 freeze of SALT II—have invariably been followed by quantitative or qualitative arms races. This moment fits a 30-year pattern of treaty erosion (ABM 2002, INF 2019) driven less by ideology than by multipolar pressures: China’s rapid build-up, emerging hypersonic and orbital delivery systems, and verification disputes in a sanctions-fragmented world. Over a 100-year horizon, New START’s lapse may matter less for immediate warhead numbers—both sides already stockpiled over 1,900 reserve warheads—than for the loss of the data-exchange and inspection habits that underpinned crisis stability since 1991. Re-institutionalising transparency in a tri- or quad-polar nuclear order will now be harder than matching warheads; history suggests that once routine trust-building mechanisms die, they take a generation to resurrect, if they return at all.
Perspectives
Liberal internationalist and arms-control–oriented outlets
e.g., The Japan Times, Rolling Out — They frame the treaty’s lapse as a historic unravelling of the rules-based nuclear order that risks a costly new arms race and urge Washington to seize the last chance for an extension. By stressing apocalyptic imagery and pinning most blame on the Trump White House, they underplay Moscow’s earlier suspension of inspections and minimize political obstacles inside Russia or China that also complicate a deal.
Russian state-run and Kremlin-sympathetic media
e.g., Sputnik International, Zero Hedge — They highlight Moscow’s readiness to prolong New START for a year and portray the United States as the recalcitrant party endangering global stability. This narrative spotlights Russia’s ‘good-faith’ offer while glossing over its own suspension of treaty obligations and continued development of exotic delivery systems, redirecting responsibility to Washington for propaganda value.
US-allied security hawks and strategic think-tank analysts
e.g., ASPI’s The Strategist, regional reports — They argue the treaty’s demise could be an opportunity to address China’s rapid nuclear build-up and that Washington may need freedom from New START limits to maintain credible deterrence alongside allies like Australia and Japan. By focusing on China’s rise and allied deterrence needs, they normalize a larger US arsenal and treat renewed competition as acceptable, downplaying escalation risks and the loss of verified transparency mechanisms.