Global & US Headlines
Kremlin Briefed on U.S. 20-Point Ukraine Peace Draft, Signals Openness to Further Back-Channel Talks
On 24 Dec 2025, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed envoy Kirill Dmitriev delivered a post-Miami briefing on a draft 20-point U.S.–Ukraine peace plan and said Moscow will now craft its formal response while keeping negotiations confidential.
Focusing Facts
- Envoy Kirill Dmitriev briefed President Putin on the Miami talks and the 20-point draft on 24 Dec 2025, according to Peskov’s press call.
- Peskov told RBC and other outlets the Kremlin insists any Ukraine negotiations remain under a “veil of secrecy,” declining to publish Russia’s counter-proposals.
- Separately, Peskov said on 21 Dec 2025 that Putin is ready to speak with France’s President Macron should “mutual political will” emerge.
Context
Great-power wars usually end through messy, often secret bargaining—from Brest-Litovsk in 1918, when Russia exited World War I after back-channel talks, to the 1973 Paris Accords that wound down U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Kremlin’s guarded acceptance of a U.S. draft echoes those episodes: battlefield realities (Russia capturing 12–17 km² per day in 2025) are translated into negotiating leverage behind closed doors. Two longer arcs are at play. First, leader-centric diplomacy is supplanting multilateral institutions; Putin’s personal line to Trump or Macron mirrors the private channels Nixon used with Zhou Enlai in 1972. Second, a century-long oscillation between transparent and clandestine peacemaking is tilting back toward secrecy, partly to manage domestic optics in an age of weaponised social media. Whether this moment matters in 2125 depends on if the Miami draft becomes another shelved blueprint like Minsk II (2015) or the opening chapter of a durable European security order. Either way, it underscores that even in an information-saturated era, the decisive moves to end wars often happen off stage.
Perspectives
Russian state-owned media
e.g., TASS — Portrays the Kremlin as confidently steering any diplomacy, stressing that talks, calls, and even the president’s yearly address will happen strictly on Moscow’s terms and preferably behind closed doors. By foregrounding Putin’s control and the need for secrecy, these outlets deflect attention from battlefield setbacks or concessions and reinforce a narrative of Russian strength and prudence.
International mainstream outlets
e.g., Anadolu, The Straits Times, National Post — Highlight the prospect of renewed dialogue—whether with Macron or via U.S.-brokered peace proposals—as a cautiously hopeful opening that could de-escalate the Ukraine war if political will exists. Their emphasis on ‘openness’ and diplomatic possibility can overstate how close any real breakthrough is, reflecting a preference for constructive headlines and the West’s desire to see progress.
Ukrainian media critical of the Kremlin
e.g., Ukrainska Pravda — Reports the same Kremlin briefings but underscores distrust—openly refusing to acknowledge Putin as president and implying Moscow’s manoeuvring is largely rhetoric. Its framing foregrounds Ukrainian sovereignty concerns and skepticism toward Russian intentions, which can downplay any genuine diplomatic movement and cast all Kremlin statements as propaganda.