UNSC Endorses Trump-Led Gaza Stabilisation Mission, 13-0

Great-power abstention echoing the 1956 Suez crisis (when the first UN Emergency Force was created) suggests that, as then, weary powers prefer an externally run buffer to open confrontation. The model also recalls UNMIK in Kosovo (1999) and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (2003) where outside administrators promised quick transition yet stayed for years, with mixed legitimacy. Structurally, the vote underscores two longer arcs: the UN’s drift toward mandating U.S.–brokered ad-hoc coalitions instead of truly multilateral peacekeeping, and Washington’s post-9/11 habit of fusing security goals with state-building projects, now repackaged under a populist ex-president’s personal brand. If implemented, this could either normalise direct great-power custodianship of contested territories—reviving a 19th-century trusteeship logic—or, if it stalls, become another footnote like the unfulfilled 1947 UN Partition Plan. On a 100-year timeline, the lasting significance will hinge on whether the vague “pathway” wording ripens into an actual Palestinian state or joins earlier shelved schemes, but the precedence of granting an individual leader executive control over a UN-backed administration is historically rare and may reshape norms of sovereignty far beyond Gaza.