Business & Economics
U.S. Green-lights South Korea’s First Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program in Trade-Security Deal
On 13–14 Nov 2025, Washington and Seoul issued a joint fact sheet that, for the first time, formally authorises South Korea to build nuclear-powered attack submarines and pledges U.S. help in securing reactor fuel as part of a broader $350 bn investment-for-tariff accord.
Focusing Facts
- White House fact sheet (released 13 Nov 23:00 EST) confirms U.S. “approval for the Republic of Korea to build nuclear-powered attack submarines” and to “work closely … to source fuel.”
- The same accord commits South Korea to invest $150 bn in U.S. shipbuilding and $200 bn in other industries, with annual cash tranches capped at $20 bn for forex-stability reasons.
- Seoul’s Defence Ministry says the first domestically built SSN could launch in the mid-to-late 2030s, aiming for a minimum fleet of four boats powered by U.S.-enriched uranium.
Context
Major powers have twice before transferred naval nuclear propulsion to allies—U.S. to the U.K. in 1958 and Australia via AUKUS in 2021—each time reshaping regional deterrence lattices. 2025 marks the third such exception, signalling that the half-century U.S. policy of preventing new SSN states is eroding under great-power competition with China. The move accelerates an Asian submarine arms cycle already spurred by China’s expanding SSBN patrols and North Korea’s declared SSN ambition. Yet precedent warns of strategic entanglement: Britain’s 1960s Polaris dependency curtailed sovereign nuclear options, and Australia’s AUKUS boats remain decades away. South Korea may likewise trade autonomy for technology while shouldering life-cycle costs that could crowd out other defence priorities. Over a 100-year arc, the decision signals a slow but steady diffusion of naval nuclear know-how beyond the original five NPT states, testing the durability of the non-proliferation regime and foreshadowing a future in which regional mid-tier powers wield continuous under-sea presence—not merely for peninsular contingencies but for wider Indo-Pacific balance.
Perspectives
South Korean government-aligned mainstream media
e.g., KBS WORLD Radio, The Korea Herald — Frame Washington’s green-light for Seoul’s nuclear-powered submarines as a long-sought diplomatic breakthrough that will bolster deterrence and deepen the alliance. Stress success and strategic upside while skimming over proliferation worries, cost burdens, and the unresolved fuel-supply question repeatedly flagged even in their own coverage.
Progressive South Korean commentators
e.g., 한겨레신문 — Warn that instead of costly nuclear submarines, Seoul should seek ‘nuclear latency’ through uranium enrichment to reclaim autonomy from the U.S. security umbrella and pursue a restrained ‘cold peace.’ Minimize the immediate military threat from Pyongyang and the alliance value, reflecting an antimilitarist tradition that could understate deterrence needs.
Chinese officials quoted in international outlets
e.g., Anadolu Ajansı, TRT World — Argue the U.S.–ROK submarine plan jeopardizes the global non-proliferation regime and heightens regional instability around the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Cast Seoul’s move as destabilizing while sidestepping Beijing’s own rapid naval nuclear expansion and its support for North Korea, revealing a strategic interest in curbing U.S. influence.